

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

250914Z Jan 05

ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AF-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	CIAE-00	INL-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	EUR-00	OIGO-00
	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	VC-00	FRB-00	H-00	TEDE-00
	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00	M-00	NEA-00
	DCP-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-00	NIMA-00	PA-00	PM-00
	GIWI-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	STR-00	TRSE-00	FMP-00
	BBG-00	IIP-00	SCRS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00
	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/001W			

-----A94D8B 250924Z /38

FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0833
INFO AMEMBASSY ABUJA
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ASMARA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USLO TRIPOLI

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000115

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT KINCANNON AND MCCUTHCHAN, AF/C, INR

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [CD](#) [SU](#) [PTER](#)

SUBJECT: CHAD: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 245841

1. Summary: Chad continues to be a strong partner in the global war against terrorism. Chad was not covered in the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. Post responses are keyed to refTel paragraph 15.

A. The Government of Chad continues to take significant actions to support the global coalition against terrorism. In 2004, Chadian troops were trained as part of the Pan Sahel Initiative. Chadian police and immigration officials participated in two Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) training programs in 2004. A group of 24 Chadian police traveled to Baton Rouge, Louisiana for training in May and 24 Chadian police officers participated in the follow-up training held in N'Djamena in December. The programs are designed to assist government officials in detecting the movement of suspicious goods or people across borders. A noteworthy anti-terrorism event occurred in northern Chad earlier this year. From March 8 to 11, Chadian security forces engaged the GSPC, a terrorist organization, which entered Chad from Niger. Over 20 members of the GSPC and three Chadian soldiers were killed in the ensuing clashes. In the days following the encounters, the MDJT captured GSPC leader Abderrazak el-Para. The MDJT handed over el-Para to Algerian authorities in October 2004.

B. The GOC has fully cooperated with all USG requests for assistance. There have been no instances in 2004 where the US asked the GOC for counter-terrorism cooperation aimed at preventing attacks and protecting US persons or interests. There were no terrorist attacks in Chad against US persons or interests. During the year, the Government held a number of meetings to discuss the harmonization of its penal code with international conventions against terrorism.

C. The GOC military engaged with the Salifist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which is designated as a terrorist organization, in March 2004 (See paragraph A).

D. Chad's judicial system has not been called upon to respond to any acts of international or domestic terrorism. The GOC did not extradite or request the extradition of any suspected terrorists for prosecution during 2004. Chad has a weak judicial system. Chad would not be a suitable forum for the prosecution of a terrorist. All host country agencies, police, military and GOC officials are cooperative, but ill-equipped to combat terrorism.

E. The police lack the capability to deal with terrorism issues. The police serve a political role in that they are one means by which the president secures his position. However, they are considered inferior to the armed forces. Combining that factor with an absence of resources creates a

situation in which the national police force of Chad is not just minimally effective, but seriously marginalized. The police have no tactical capability. Police special operations capability is non-existent. There is no bomb-disposal capability in Chad in the law-enforcement sense. The police have no long-range or integrated communications capabilities and very minimal tactical radio capability. The police are not properly equipped with weapons, and not equipped at all with other basic tools of law-enforcement. Investigative capabilities within the different directorates of the national police are rudimentary, but can be effective nonetheless. Relying on a wide-spread information-gathering network at the grassroots level, they are able to effectively monitor activities within their own borders. Preventive-intelligence gathering is functional, but hampered significantly by communications problems.

F. Chad's shares land borders with five other countries. Chad does not have the resources to patrol its borders. As a result, all of its borders are porous.

G. Chad participated in PSI training in June/July 2004. Chadian police and immigration officials received ATA training in June and August 2004. The Chadian Law Enforcement community has been very receptive to ATA

training. The Chadian Police have received two ATA classes so far, Critical Incident Management and Vital Installation. The attitude towards this type of counter-terrorism training has been very positive. The biggest responsibility in the future for the police and military is to control transnational terrorism and the difficult task of controlling their porous borders. Physical security of the frontiers of Chad is the responsibility of the military, rather than the police, who control ports of entry. The intelligence bureau of the national police force, also has responsibility for monitoring the borders of Chad in conjunction with the military. RSO Chad has requested training in 2006 to improve Chad's rural border patrol operations and has requested that this training be coordinated with PSI to ensure that there is no duplication of effort between ATA and DOD.

H. The military unit that received PSI training has been re-designated as the "anti-terrorism unit".

I. For information on the Chadian military encounter with the GSPC, see paragraph A. Internally, cooperation between the High Council for Islamic Affairs and the Government of Chad has resulted in the banning of specific groups and imams. The Muslim community in Chad is largely self-regulating and the predominately Muslim Government is consistently ready to curb extremist activities.

J. The Chadian military conducts operation in the north to counter-terrorism and protect its borders. The GOC has 500 troops and participates in a joint border patrol with 200 French soldiers along the border with Sudan. This deployment is aimed at preventing cross-border attacks from Darfur and protecting Chad from Chadian rebel groups allegedly forming inside Sudan.

K. Chadian Government officials, from President Deby to low level police and immigration officials, demonstrate consistent support for counter-terrorism efforts and a strong desire for more C/T training.

L. As previously mentioned, the Chadian Government is willing to counter terrorist activities. However, Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world and lacks the resources to strengthen its capacity to fight terrorism.

M. The GOC does not harbor or support the financial or training activities of terrorists. In 2002, Chad ordered all of the country's banks to freeze any accounts suspected of suspected terrorist groups or organizations.

N. The GOC does not make public statements regarding states that sponsor terror.

O. Status of terrorist activity in Chad will be sent via classified e-mail.

P. Northern Chad is the area in which terrorist groups would be most likely to operate because of its inaccessibility. However, due to the extremely difficult desert terrain and harsh climate, a group wishing to operate in the north would require the assistance of locals to survive.

Q. The Chadian military encounter with the GSPC constitutes a preventive attack against terrorism. Reporting on a terrorism-related arrest will follow in classified channels.

R. The Chadian military engaged with the terrorist organization GSPC in March 2004. See paragraph A.

12. Embassy POCs are Kathleen FitzGibbon (P/E Officer),
e-mail: fitzgibbonka@state.gov and Patrick Leonard (RSO),
e-mail: leonardpa@state.gov

13. Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL

NNNN